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Abstract
What is deemed ‘good’ or ‘humane’ care often seems to be underpinned by a standard ideal of an able-bodied, au-
tonomous human being, which not only underlies those ‘social and professional structures within which narratives and
decisions regarding various impairments are held’ (Ho, 2008), but also co-shapes these structures. This paper aims to ex-
plore how a relational form of auto-ethnography can promote good care. Rather than being based on and focused toward
this standard ideal, it challenges ‘humanity’ by showing how illness narratives, public discourse, and policy are framed by
ethical questions. It illustrates how normative ideas dictate policy and public discourse. It critically questions this constitu-
tive power by shifting attention to the lived experiences of people with chronic illness and disability. By highlighting and
reflecting together on the first author’s life with a chronic illness and his son’s disability, and thereby framing the narrative,
it will be argued that, in order to improve care practices, personal illness and disability narratives and the way they inter-
lock with public narrative and auto-ethnographic methodologies should be investigated.
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From: Alistair Niemeijer
Sent: Friday 18 October 2014 14:12
To: Merel Visse
Subject: Re: Arcle auto-ethnography
Dear Merel,
I just wanted to tell you that I have ﬁnally read the auto-ethnographic arcle you co-wrote with Truus, and it made a 
huge impression on me. On the one hand because it is an account of a fellow researcher, and, as you have pointed out 
before, not everyone working in academia is willing to tell their own story. On the other hand it is so unique because 
I have come across so few of these arcles before. So many things that were described struck a chord with me, such 
as the cyclical aspect of having a chronic illness (rather than a linear one) and doing lots of silly things just to ‘belong’ 
(remember last conference when I had to sleep on the ﬂoor of an empty classroom just to get some rest).
Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 168–175 168
I remember that when I ﬁrst became ill I had given myself the personal assignment to also create something from this, 
or to cite the arcle: ‘I’d beer do something with it’, but in my case also something ‘good’, whatever that may be. 
Now, inspired by your arcle, and spurred on by our other colleagues, I hope to also contribute something, and if you 
think this is a good idea, I would very much like to involve you (and your experse) in this. So thanks again for sending 
me the arcle, it is very encouraging for me to see that such a unique perspecve is actually valued as such.
Best,
Alistair
1. Introduction
This article illustrates and discusses howa relational form
of auto-ethnography might promote good care by high-
lighting the everyday realities of living with a chronic ill-
ness or disability. As care ethicists with a strong affin-
ity with Disability Studies, we are always interested in
promoting good care and therefore ask whether a rela-
tional auto-ethnography on living with illness and disabil-
ity might contribute towards that aim.
In general, auto-ethnography might be understood
as an approach involving autobiography, self-observa-
tion, and reflexive investigation in the context of ethno-
graphic inquiry, thereby connecting the personal to the
public (Ellis, 2004; Maréchal, 2010; Visse & Niemeijer,
2016). It differs from ethnography specifically in the fore-
grounding of the researcher’s own (private) experiences
and subjectivity, as opposed to attempting to limit these.
Indeed, as Denzin (2014) has pointed out, any qualitative
inquiry which is aimed at social justice (and a more car-
ing society) should ‘develop a methodology that allows
us to examine how the private troubles of individuals
are connected to public issues and to public responses
to these troubles’ (Denzin, 2014, pp. 5–6). However, as
Ellingson and Ellis (2008) have indicated, ‘the meanings
and applications of auto-ethnography have evolved in a
manner that makes precise definition difficult’ (p. 449).
In this case, the so-called ‘private troubles’ are those of
the first author. The above email sent by the first author
to the second author served as a starting point for a mu-
tual, relational endeavor, as opposed to a solitary, non-
cultural (thus autobiographic) undertaking. Both authors
are care ethical scholars working at a university depart-
ment. The first author lives both with a chronic illness
and a young son with Down’s Syndrome in, what Arthur
Frank has so aptly called, a remission society, where pa-
tients are ‘effectively well, but could never be considered
cured’ (Frank, 2005, p. 163).
According to Pols (2013), when care in society ‘chroni-
fies’, as might be the case in chronic illness and disabil-
ity, there is a need for new knowledge and new values
to re-orient care. Instead of viewing care and treatment
as one-time events provided by professionals or short
interruptions in the life of one person that ought to be
self-managed, Pols argues that it becomes important to
look at how care practices are shaped over time and how
these might help people live with their illness and/or dis-
ability (Pols, 2013).
The emphasis in care ethics lies in the study of ev-
eryday care practices in the context of societies, rather
than trying to encompass the totality of (a) society. By
eliciting critical events of daily routines of people liv-
ing with disease or disability and the everyday aspira-
tions of caregivers, these studies can inform us about
why and how what might be conceived of as ‘good’
emerges, and under what conditions (cf. Klaver, van
Elst, & Baart, 2014; Pols, 2013). This entails that the ac-
counts and the representations of what currently might
be depicted as ‘humane’ and ‘caring’ have to be seen
against a background of sound (historical) anthropology
describing everyday life. Rather than viewing care as ‘hu-
mane’, we deal with practices in which ‘(hu)man(e)’ is
produced relationally (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016).
Research geared towards the humanization of practices
should thus not be simply restricted to theoretical re-
flection and clarification but should also aspire to make
a practical contribution to fostering specific humaniza-
tion as both an outcome and a process simultaneously
(Visse, 2012).
As these social practices change rapidly under the
influence of current (political and socio-economic) reali-
ties, this means (re-)interpreting these practices through
repeated and meticulous empirical research and con-
necting emerging insights with theory. Consequently, as
we aim to show in this paper, this should be done by
mapping and comparing ways of living in such a man-
ner that it leads to knowledge about what it means to
be human, which is not only relevant to a particular per-
son, but which might also be useful for what happens to
others elsewhere. Ultimately we will argue that the ‘clas-
sic humanist trope’ (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016) of
a lone, fully functioning able-bodied thinking subject no
longer works as an image of what it means to be (a caring
and cared for) human, and is therefore in need of other,
richer concepts in order to improve practices of care for
people with chronic disease and disability.
2. Contesting an Ableist Ideology
What is deemed ‘humane’ invariably depends on the his-
torical and cultural dynamics of meanings (of life) and
constantly shifting articulations of ’humane’ in particu-
lar settings. This is particularly pertinent in (institutional-
ized) care, as neo-liberalist policies have urged more and
more people living with illness and disability to take con-
trol over their own health and life and act accordingly,
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as independent users and consumers (Teunissen, Visse,
& Abma, 2015). Simultaneously, in recent decades, inter-
twining ideas of self-determination and well-being have
received tremendous support in the disabilitymovement
and in bioethics, guaranteeing people with disabilities
a voice and protecting them against any patronizing
and unwanted paternalism. However, less attention has
been paid to the ableist ideology which seems to under-
pin these ideas, including the social structures which in-
fluence any form of decision-making (Ho, 2008).
Moreover, an ableist form of autonomy is often only
upheld as a form of negative freedom, i.e. the absence
of (extraneous) interference or coercion. It contrasts as
such with the (ethical) motives of care professionals to
involve or engage themselves with others and it has lit-
tle room for the value of concrete practices and par-
ticular relationships (Hertogh, 2010) and still less for
sensitivity to ‘the complex conditions that actually sup-
port the unique identity of those individuals needing …
care’ (Agich, 2003, p. 134). Consequently such a nega-
tive conception of autonomy is hardly useful in formulat-
ing an ethics of (chronic) care and reflects the ‘idealized
paradigm of choice or decision-making dominating ethi-
cal analysis’ (Agich, 2003, p. 165).
To seriously consider how somebody experiences life,
what challenges he or she encounters and, based on
this, to think about what it means to care well for peo-
ple with (chronic) illness and/or disability, implies ap-
proaching ‘care’ from both a more person-centered and
relational perspective. Nevertheless, modern care poli-
cies seem to presuppose an ‘ideal(ized) client/patient’,
namely an able-minded, autonomous agent who seeks
independence and appropriates care services as such.
To be able-bodied and able-minded is indeed often the
ideal on which meanings of a good life are constructed
(Hertogh, 2010; Ho, 2008). These meanings underlie
not only ‘the social and professional structures within
which discussions and decisions regarding various impair-
ments are held’ (Ho, 2008, p. 198) but also the aims and
‘consumption’ of (institutionalized) care services that co-
shape these structures. As Goodley and Runswick-Cole
(2016) suggest: ‘many disabled people have been denied
the opportunity to occupy the position of the modernist
humanistic subject: bounded, rational, capable, respon-
sible and competent. Being recognized as having these
ideals is understandably a big deal (it is a mark of being
considered human after all).’ However, this raises an im-
portant epistemological question: how can people with
chronic illness or disability actually be viewed as (more)
human if this concept is underpinned by a deficient yet
pervasive, ‘ableist’ humanistic ideal?
Rather than simply looking for what is ’just’ or what
is ‘humane’ in a given practice, we would like to argue
here that it might be more helpful to shift the focus to
what matters to the people whose positions (or in fact,
human-ness) are contested. In other words, what people
care for and about as evaluative beings (Sayer, 2011). But
how can this evaluative knowledge be accessed? Auto-
ethnography, as an epistemology andmethodological ap-
proach, might be one possibility.
3. Accessing the Particular
According to Neumann, auto-ethnographic texts democ-
ratize the representational sphere of culture, by locat-
ing the particular experiences of individuals in tension
with dominant expressions of discursive power (Neu-
mann, 1996). Hence, auto-ethnography has a political di-
mension: it has the potential to reclaim authentic voices
which are often less visible (or audible) than those of
people deemed ‘more able’, by introducing (vulnerable)
insiders’ perspectives on experiencing living with illness
and disability.What people care for and about, what they
are responsive to, is often not well defined but emerges
from a complex sociopolitical process of relating to each
other in everyday situations. We can only thoroughly un-
derstand the particularities of these situations and the
people involved by looking closely at what happens in
particular situations and how people experience these
occurrences. In order to be able to distinguish an oc-
currence and an ‘event’ (or epiphany, in line with Den-
zin), we need to become familiar with the setting and
embody an insider’s perspective. As an outsider, we are
not always able to determine what events and situations
mean; we do not know whether we can actually label
any occurrence as an event. Thus, we would like to pro-
pose here a radical emphasis on the particular. However,
in our view, placing the ‘particular’ at the center should
also involve recognizing the sociopolitical and relational
nature of knowledge of ‘the particular’.
At the same time, we view auto-ethnography as a
mutual endeavor: an epistemological approach and a
methodology that allows us to examine dialogically the
‘radically particular’ (Visse & Niemeijer, 2016). It is only
through dialogue (not necessarily verbal conversation,
but dialogue in the broad sense of an encounter) that
insiders’ knowledge and experiences of persons can be-
come known. Through dialogue, tacit understandings be-
come visible and can be reflected on together.
Care ethics has always emphasized the importance
of voice and dialogue that enables an inclusive (deliber-
ative and responsive) approach. Despite this attention,
there is still a lack of in-depth understanding of how to
hear particular voices, perspectives and experiences. It
is important to acknowledge here that ‘voice’ is not a
panacea. Equally important (one might say requisite) to
expression of voice is an audience: voices have to reach
those who are willing to listen and reflect on what they
are hearing. Consider for example, the following tran-
script of a recorded reflection by the first author (who
shares his voice with a later potential listener, in this case
the second author):
‘I feel really tired today, even though I have had a rel-
atively relaxed weekend. But it is as if I’m constantly
short of breath. It started this morning, something
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didn’t feel right, and yes, then you immediately start
to worry whether this is a sign that you have been do-
ing too much, or that things are worsening again, be-
cause I tend to always interpret these things always
in terms of progression or exacerbation. And that can
be tiring in itself, because sometimes you just want to
be tired without there being a dimension of ‘this will
have these and those consequences’ etcetera. Not
just for me, but also my family, friends and even col-
leagues. This is especially difficult with regard to my
work—I am actually recording this at work this mo-
ment, alone in my office—because you really want to
remain productive, effective even and not burden oth-
ers with your illness. Recording this at least givesme a
sense that I am sort of spending my time worthwhile,
but when I am tired like this, it is so difficult to work ef-
fectively. You tend to linger with certain things, and of
course you actually do less, but you’re also somewhat
irritatedwith yourself that you’re doing so little, show-
ing so little productivity. But, funnily enough, at the
same time, you tend to also be satisfied more quickly
with doing anything at all, even if it doesn’t count as
being productive. Now it is always difficult as an aca-
demic to pinpoint exactly the productivity of all that I
do. Is this recording actually productive? But of course
I have set tasks, such as correcting papers, responding
to students’ emails, that are waiting and I can’t seem
to come round to today as I have so little energy.’
The above example gives us an insight into the immedi-
ate and personal thoughts of the first author, who men-
tions the fact that he is tired, but also reflects on how
this fatigue is reinforced by feelings of not knowing how
to interpret it and onwhat itmeans for his productivity as
a professional. In a certain sense, one might say that he
has internalized an all-too familiar discourse which has
been prominent inmodernWestern society and requires
people to manage their lives independently and success-
fully and act as if their lives were an open project (Gid-
dens, 1991). It is also interwoven into policies that are
designed top down, focused on efficiency and productiv-
ity, and which lack consultation or deliberation with the
people they concern. The above example shows that this
individualization discourse affects the perspectives and
expectations of all citizens, professionals and institutions,
including thosewith a chronic illness and/or disability. As
a result, people find themselves in ambiguous practices
dominated by policy perspectives aimed at individualiza-
tion, which may ultimately lead to a more ‘dark and po-
litical’ side of care (O’Toole & Meier, 2003; Visse, 2012).
4. Relational Auto-Ethnography
At this point it is important to reiterate that we do not
view auto-ethnography solely as an approach to gain ac-
cess to insiders’ knowledge and experience (i.e. ‘voice’),
but as a necessary space in which to enter a dialogi-
cal learning process regarding good care that constitutes
and articulates voices simultaneously. Auto-ethnography
fosters learning processes of self-understanding. For ex-
ample, ethno-graphing illness entails actively interpret-
ing (mapping out) the meaning of illness in cultural con-
texts. This interpretive ‘act’ can be seen as an act of car-
ing for the self by being attentive to one’s own needs
and preferences, and responding to increased awareness
of those needs. However, a relational auto-ethnography
would also entail caring for others, and being open to oth-
ers’ perspectives in the construction of one’s lifeworld. In
line with dialogical hermeneutics, the self and the other
are not separated, but closely engaged in a dialogical pro-
cess where the subject matter unfolds in the dialogue
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 396). In situations where self and
other are related, the process of self-understanding can
be seen as constitutive of the dialogue and vice versa.
Sharing experiences with disability or illness in the
context of auto-ethnography occurs between people
who are seen as interdependent beings. Only one per-
son articulating experiences while the other person ‘cap-
tures’ or asks questions does not foster a humane prac-
tice and might even lead to what Guba and Lincoln
(1989) have dubbed ‘malconstructions’ of people’s per-
spectives. For instance, social activist and critical thinker
bell hooks (Gloria Jean Watkins) has questioned the aca-
demic’s engagement with the Other, and argued that, to
truly engage, the academic would have to remove him
or herself as ‘the expert’ at the center of the relation, in
order to avoid ‘colonization’ of the Other’s own story:
‘[There is] no need to hear your voice, when I can talk
about you better than you can speak about yourself.
No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your
pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it
back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a
way that it has becomemine, my own. Re-writing you,
I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am
still [the] colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are
now at the center of my talk.’ (Hooks, 1990, p. 43)
Accordingly, how people respond to and engagewith one
another will ideally always occur from a stance of open-
ness to genuinely understanding the other (Gadamer,
1975, p. 390), despite possible conflicts or disagree-
ments. Only in this case can auto-ethnography be seen
as a praxis of care (Visse & Niemeijer, 2016). Accord-
ing to Gadamer, the process of accessing and widening
one’s own point of view is always dialogical. Through di-
alogue, people articulate, explore, interpret, ‘test’ and
transform their experiences. This does not happen inten-
tionally, but occurs in and through conversation and en-
counter. This means we cannot control or influence un-
derstanding deliberately. We can however, be open to
understanding, by listening to the other and being pre-
pared tomove into a shared dimension of meaning: ‘The
prejudices of the individual, farmore than his judgments,
constitute the historical reality of his being’ (Gadamer,
1975, p. 245).
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In the context of care, personal meanings, empathic
understanding, suspension of judgment, and apprehend-
ing the other’s reality as a possibility are necessary for
auto-ethnography to foster care (Noddings, 1984). For
instance, the second author of the article tries to make
sense of the experiences of the first author, writing to
him the following email:
From: Merel Visse
Sent: Saturday 3 January 2015 16:15
To: Alistair Niemeijer
Subject: aer having read your transcripts.
Dear Alistair,
Intrigued I read your transcripts (1 t/m 6). A few mes I lay them aside and picked them up again. Finally today I could 
see a recurring theme through all of it….Of course, I am wring this with a large disclaimer: this is my interpretaon 
or lens. So please tell me if this does not resonate with you.
When I was reading I was constantly asking myself: who is telling the story? This is Alistair, he is wring in the ﬁrst 
person. But then: Yes, but which Alistair? It was as if I could read diﬀerent selves, or voices from the same one Alistair. 
Oen you start the sentence with ‘I’…and then a personal experience is recounted. But then, and you also menon 
this, you start to evaluate these experiences. It is as if you’re an ongoing evaluator.
So I started to wonder: who is this ‘self‘ which is evaluang, or which voice is actually speaking? At mes you also write 
about diﬀerent posions of this ‘self’, although these are not always clearly present, but at mes you seem to 
transcend all of these ‘selves’, reﬂecng on a certain meta level on how you are telling your story. When you are 
recounng, you oen tend to posion yourself (explicitly) in relaon to others. Now from a care ethical perspecve 
this is not strange, but you seem to do this very explicitly. Whether you are not ‘a burden’, or ‘a bore’, or whether you 
can ‘fulﬁll certain expectaons’ etcetera. At the same me you have also menoned loneliness and inmacy (of which 
the laer actually seems to point to a warm relaon with yourself).
To sum up: perhaps it would be useful to disnguish between these ‘mulple selves’, each with their own posions (in 
me, but also with regard to others) and the conﬂicts between these posions, including the relaons and meanings 
that are involved?
One of the reasons this might be useful is that it could lead to a (care ethical) redeﬁning of for instance ‘self-manage-
ment’….because, as you have shown, self-management would then not make any sense, because there is not simply 
1 self.
Let me know what you think!
Best,
Merel
An important insight that comes to the fore here is the
fact that people with a chronic illness are not simply pa-
tients, but also partners, colleagues, consumers, and so-
liloquists. Once they make a decision concerning treat-
ment or care, we should ask: which self (if not a combi-
nation of multiple selves and/or multiple discourses) is
making this decision?Andhowdoes it contrastwithwhat
the other self would prefer? This is in strong contrast
with the dominant conceptualization of man and soci-
ety stemming from liberal political theory, which projects
people as individuals who are independent and self-
sufficient, and portrays the ideal relationship in more or
less contractual terms, where people act as equal citi-
zens within a public realm (Agich, 2003; Hertogh, 2010;
Nussbaum, 2006; Tronto, 1993). It is highly questionable
whether vulnerable people with an illness or disability, if
indeed any of us,meet this idealized assumption of being
totally independent and self-sufficient, or whether this is
not simply ‘a mere fiction’ (Kittay, 2011, p. 51). Indeed,
should being human be seen not as singular, but rather
as polyvocal? If this is the case which self is ultimately
responsible? And which self has priority in making ‘in-
formed’ decisions?
Nevertheless, rational choice and independence is
still the predominant approach in dealing with norma-
tive issues in care and this has several important implica-
tions for people with chronic illness and disability. Firstly,
this emphasis on independence leads to a discourse in
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which ‘the language of rights eclipses other ethical lan-
guage’, as care is primarily thought of in terms of prob-
lems which can be regulated and dealt with by establish-
ing rights (Agich, 2003). However, it may also create a
backlash against dependence of any sort, with those in
need of care susceptible to the pejorativemeanings asso-
ciatedwith illness, dependence or disability (Agich, 2003;
Hertogh, 2010). This can occur despite the fact that there
is a growing interest in patient experiences and patient
stories, as the following fragment of a recorded conver-
sation between the authors examines:
Alistair: what I seem to miss in those patient stories,
particularly of those living with inflammatory bowel
disease (IBD)—and there is plenty of material, patient
blogs and vlogs, several books etc.—is that it often
stops at the toilet door. You can never look behind the
door. The way experiences are told are in a sort of re-
mote way, sometimes even in third person. So if you
tell people more graphic experiences about pooh and
diarrhea, which is an integral part of this disease…well
then.
Merel: you open up the conversation, because all
conventions suggest ‘one shouldn’t talk about these
things’...?
Alistair: Exactly, and in public discourse certain dis-
eases seem to be more interesting or more ‘sexy’ to
talk about, such as certain forms of cancer tend to be
in the media more than other forms, which is not al-
ways dependent on the number of people with this ill-
ness. For instance, what I find quite remarkable is that
my son’s disability is much more well-known than my
own disease. When I say that my son has Down’s Syn-
drome, I don’t really have to explain myself. Yes, of
course there are all these misconceived notions and
ideas about this disability, but most people seem to
have at least a basic idea of what it involves. Whereas
when Imention I have Crohn’s disease, half of the time
people haven’t even heard of it. Even though the IBD
population ismuch larger! I think thismight be related
to the somewhat embarrassing aspect of this disease,
plus the non-visible aspect. It is kind of an elusive or
incomprehensible type of illness. In my experience,
many people are always very surprised when they
learn I have this illness. I remember when we went
to that conference in Stuttgart, when I was still in the
midst of a flare up and at some point somebody asked
me whether I had the ‘flu...I don’t mind it that much,
and kind of understand it, because if you don’t see
it, then, well...I realize that when as colleagues you
still receive coherent, ‘semi-intelligent’ contributions
from me, that this doesn’t match up with somebody
who is very ill at that particular moment, maybe the
expectation of people is that my contribution would
be something less coherent. That in a sense you’re
only ill when you’re also ill on an intellectual level,
even though you know fromyourworkwith Truus that
this doesn’t really matter.
Merel: So you are giving the illness a face? Or actually
several faces, including the public face, the intellec-
tual side of things, but also the raw side, the so-called
‘dirty’ side of things?
Alistair: I suppose yes you could say, that some of
these sides tend to come to the fore more at partic-
ular moments more than other sides, but what inter-
ests me as a researcher also is which side to focus on.
Merel: I have always had the impression with Truus,
but also with other students, that whatever you are
going through, there are always multiple parallel pro-
cesses going on at the same time and you can’t cap-
ture these completely but you might gain some ac-
cess to some, but only if you study this on a very
small scale, as opposed to large studies of patient
experience.
Auto-ethnography is a way to acknowledge the many
sides of the illness experience, both public and private,
and to make them visible and known. This is a practice
that honors people as capable; for example the first au-
thor’s ability to function well as an assistant professor
despite his illness. Simultaneously, such a practice also
respects people as vulnerable beings, with everyday dif-
ficulties such as anxiety about the presence of blood in
their stools or explaining to others what it means to live
with the disease. They may include raw images of vomit
and excrement that are rarely spoken about in connec-
tion with the first person, thereby putting the actual ma-
teriality of being ill in the foreground, rather than confin-
ing it to a (sanitized) medical discourse.
Being ill includes a bodily vulnerability, but also,
as the above fragment illustrates, a social vulnerability
(Schües, 2014). Social vulnerability refers to the poten-
tial of being judged by others, for example when the first
author reflects on his capacity to contribute (intelligently
and coherently) even though he is in the midst of an in-
flammation of his disease. Besides this social vulnerabil-
ity, a person with a chronic illness or disability also runs
the risk of being institutionally vulnerable. The first au-
thor could, for example, lose his job because people can-
not understand the fact that he is capable of certain con-
tributions (sharing his thoughts) but not of others (lec-
turing to a class). The image of a capable, able-bodied,
thinking subject no longer works as an image of what it
means to be (a caring and cared for) human. The frag-
ment shows that we should produce more suitable, mul-
tiple images that honor both the capabilities and the vul-
nerabilities of people with chronic disease and disability,
rather than viewing these dichotomously. We strongly
believe that auto-ethnography has the potential to do ex-
actly that.
5. Conclusion
The relatively young discipline of care ethics has alerted
us to the need to reflect on care as practices of care, with
a particular emphasis on interdependence, on relations
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as the locus of discovery of what is good (or humane),
and on the particular good of people within a particu-
lar context. Care ethics does not depart from a specific
norm or principle of (what ought to be) good care, be-
cause it does not conceive of good care as something
static or a-historical (cf. Hertogh, 2010; Mol et al., 2010)
and because the ethical content of practices might itself
be comprehended as ‘a way to be normative’ (Willems
& Pols, 2010, p. 163). In fact, the supposedly neutral
practice of ethical and moral reasoning as such should
not be conceived of as value free, but instead as con-
text sensitive and servingmultiple interests (Leget, 2013;
Walker, 2007).
In line with this, auto-ethnography as a praxis of
care critiques an individualization discourse which in-
volves isolated selves, absolute truths or certainties, and
a-historicity. In line with what Merton has termed ‘so-
ciological autobiography‘, which includes ‘perspectives,
ideas, concepts, findings, and analytical procedures to
construct and interpret a narrative text that purports to
tell one’s own history within the larger history of one’s
times’ (Merton, 1972, p. 18), auto-ethnography tries to
focus on factors such as personalmeaning, empathic con-
nection and resonation in order to uncover stories about
‘embodied struggles’ (Ellis, 2013), while being responsive
to ambiguity, complexity and difference(s).
Consequently, auto-ethnography has the potential to
create space for topics to which access is difficult and
to stimulate the emergence of a variety of creative (re-
)presentations through a mutual learning process. Of
course, we are mindful of the potential pitfalls of auto-
ethnography; for example, the discussion of very per-
sonal events can lead to a situation of great vulnerability.
Also, auto-ethnography can be susceptible to too much
introspection, leading even to (self-)obsession, whereby
one’s own role is given toomuch priority and there is not
the adequate amount of critical reflection or rigor that
should accompany sound (qualitative) research.
Nevertheless, we feel that auto-ethnography holds
great promise not only in care inquiry and disability stud-
ies, but also beyond the specific fields of (academic)
inquiry. After all, there is an ‘untapped well of per-
sonal experience’ among all our own colleagues (and stu-
dents), friends and family. Developing a relational auto-
ethnography on illness or disability, with its unique com-
bination of mutual reflection on the personal (evocative,
literary and narrative) and attention to both capability
and vulnerability, is not a question of ‘capturing’ a pa-
tient’s voice or story. It is rather both a relational and car-
ing practice itself which entails carefully handling vulner-
abilities, listening, being attentive and responsive, and fa-
cilitating the exploration of valuable sociopolitical knowl-
edge, whilst at the same time co-creating a fuller picture
of someone who is faced with illness or disability, but de-
fined beyond their perceived limitations.
Acknowledgements
The authorswould like to thank Truus Teunissen and Silke
Hoppe for their contributions during an earlier stage of
this article.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Agich, G. (2003). Dependence and autonomy in old age:
An ethical framework for long term care. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Denzin, N. (2014). Interpretive autoethnography. Los An-
geles: Sage.
Ellingson, L., & Ellis, C. (2008). Autoethnography as con-
structionist project. In J. A. Holstein & J. F. Gubrium
(Eds.), Handbook of constructionist research (pp.
445–466). New York: Guilford Press.
Ellis, C. (2004). The ethnographic I: A methodologi-
cal novel about autoethnography. Walnut Creek: Al-
taMira Press.
Ellis, C. (2013). Crossing the rabbit hole. Autoethno-
graphic life review. Qualitative Inquiry, 19(1), 35–45.
Frank, A. (2005). The remission society. In P. Conrad (Ed.),
The sociology of health and illness (pp. 163–166).
New York: Worth Publishers.
Gadamer, H. G. (1975). Truth and method. New York:
Seabury Press.
Giddens, A. (1991).Modernity and self-identity: Self and
society in the late modern age. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Goodley, D., & Runswick-Cole, K. (2016) Becoming dishu-
man: Thinking about the human through dis/ability.
Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education,
37(1), 1–15.
Guba, E., & Lincoln, G. (1989). Fourth generation evalua-
tion. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hertogh, C. M. P. M. (2010). De Senectute: Ethiek en
kwetsbaarheid. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.
Ho, A. (2008). The individualist model of autonomy and
the challenge of disability. Bioethical Inquiry, 5, 193–
207.
Hooks, B. (1990). Marginality as a site of resistance. In
R. Ferguson, M. Gever, T. T. Minh-ha, & C. West
(Eds.), Out there: Marginalization and contemporary
cultures (pp. 241–243). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kittay, E. (2011). The ethics of care, dependence, and dis-
ability. Ratio Juris, 24(1), 4958.
Klaver, K., van Elst, E., & Baart, A. J. (2014). Demarcation
of the ethics of care as a discipline: Discussion article.
Nursing Ethics. doi:10.1177/0969733013500162
Leget, C. J. W. (2013). Analyzing dignity: A perspective
from the ethics of care. Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy, 16, 945–952.
Maréchal, G. (2010). Autoethnography. In A. J. Mills,
Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 168–175 174
G. Durepos & E. Wiebe (Eds.), Encyclopedia of case
study research (Vol. 2, pp. 43–45). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.
Merton, R. K. (1972). Insiders and outsiders: A chapter
in the sociology of knowledge. American Journal of
Sociology, 78(1), 9–47.
Mol, A., Moser, I., & Pols, A. J. (Eds.). (2010). Care in
practice. On tinkering in clinics, homes and farms.
Transcript-verlag: Bielefeld.
Neumann, M. (1996). Collecting ourselves at the end of
the century. In C. Ellis & A. Bochner (Eds.), Composing
ethnography: Alternative forms of qualitative writing
(pp. 172–198). Walnut Creek: Alta Mira.
Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to
ethics and moral education. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2006). Frontiers of justice. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
O’Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2003). Plus ça change: Pub-
lic management, personnel stability, and organiza-
tional performance. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 13(1), 43–64.
Pols, J. (2013). The chronification of illness. An empiri-
cal ethics in care. (Inaugural lecture). Retrieved from
www.oratiereeks.nl
Sayer, A. (2011).Why things matter to people: Social sci-
ence, values and ethical life. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Schües, C. (2014). Age and future. In S. Stoller (Ed.), Si-
mone de Beauvoir’s philosophy of age: Gender, ethics,
and time (pp. 215–230). Berlin: De Gruyter.
Tronto, J. (1993).Moral boundaries: A political argument
for an ethic of care. New York: Routledge.
Teunissen, G. J., Visse, M. A., & Abma, T. A. (2015). Strug-
gling Between Strength and Vulnerability, a patients’
counter story. Health Care Analysis, 23(3), 288–305.
Visse, M. (2012). Openings for humanization in mod-
ern health care practices (PhD thesis). VU University,
Amsterdam.
Visse, M., & Niemeijer, A. R. (2016). Autoethnography
as a praxis of care. The promises and pitfalls of au-
toethnography as a commitment to care. Qualitative
Research Journal, 16(3), 301–312.
Walker, M. U. (2007). Moral understandings. A feminist
study in ethics. London: Routledge.
Willems, D., & Pols, J. (2010). Goodness! The empirical
turn in health care ethics. Medische Antropologie,
22(1), 161–170.
About the Author
Alistair Niemeijer (PhD) works as an assistant professor in care ethics at the University of Humanistic
Studies (Utrecht, NL) and as a post-doctoral researcher at the Vu University Medical Center (Amster-
dam, NL). His PhD research has focused on the ethics of surveillance technology in long term care.
Next to his autoethnographic pursuits, he currently supervises a multi-disciplinary research project on
human dignity in public health policy.
Merel Visse (PhD) is assistant professor and senior researcher at the University of Humanistic Studies,
and combines rigorous scientific research with practical experimentation to foster practices of good
care. She is an expert in responsive inquiry and evaluation approaches that nourish personal expe-
riences and the unique histories of the people involved. Merel’s work is carried out in many realms,
always togetherwith thosewhom it concerns: fromhospitals and residential homes, to neighborhoods
and family homes, with both non-profit and for-profit institutions.
Social Inclusion, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 168–175 175
